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ABSTRACT 
 
Using the female CEO and male CEO groups over a 14-year (1992–2013) period, we find that the male CEOs use 
aggressive discretionary accruals and real activities operations in order to report small positive earnings or small 
earnings increases whereas the earnings management using real activities operation of suspect firms disappear in the 
female CEO group. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
he gender effect on human behavior has long been a controversial topic across academic fields. In the 
recent years, the gender issue has drawn attention in business and finance areas. Many European 
countries have passed laws that require a minimum number of female directors on the board. For 
example, Norway has required that 40 % of the board members of a company be female since 2008 while Spain has 
mandated the same condition since 2015. Following Norway and Spain, other European countries have considered 
enacting similar laws. This legal movement for gender diversity on the board of directors seems to stem from the 
notion that female directors are less likely to take high risks and more likely to be ethical than male directors, 
suggesting that hiring female executive members could increase the transparency of firms (Betz et al. 1989; Niessen 
and Ruenzi 2006). 
 
One method of gauging the transparency of firms is estimating the earnings management of the firms. Since the CEO 
has the power to make decisions for a firm, the gender of CEO may affect the earnings management of the firm. 
Specifically, a CEO’s gender may influence the earnings management of a firm when the CEO of the firm has a strong 
incentive to inflate earnings in order to achieve profit or earnings increases. To address this issue comprehensively, 
we first define suspect firms as those which achieve small earnings or small earnings increases, where earnings 
management are most likely to occur according to previous studies (Roychowdhury 2006; Gunny 2010; Zang 2011). 
Then, we divide the sample into firms with male CEOs and those with female CEOs, and examine earnings 
management of suspect firms across the two subsamples. To estimate a firm’s earnings management activities, we use 
both accrual management, proxied by the performance-matched discretionary accruals estimated from the modified 
Jones model (Dechow et al.1995; Kothari et al. 2005), and real management, proxied by abnormal cash flow from 
operations, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses (Roychowdhury 2006). Also, this study 
investigates using both the ordinary least square (hereinafter OLS) method and Heckman’s (1979) two-stage procedure 
to control for sample selection bias. The major findings of this paper are as follows. First, we observe that suspect 
firms manage earning significantly by accruals and real activities to avoid losses or earnings decreases. The same 
pattern of earnings management also appears when the CEO gender of suspect firms is male, but disappears when the 
CEO gender is female. The results suggest that a male CEO manages discretionary accruals and real activities to avoid 
losses or earnings decreases while female CEO does not. All results are qualitatively the same when we use the OLS 
or Heckman’s (1979) method.  
 
The prior accounting research also investigates the effects of gender on the quality of accounting information, such as 
accruals or earnings quality. Several studies document that firms with gender diversity in the board of directors or a 
female CFO have better accrual quality (Krishnan and Parsons 2008; Barua et al. 2010; Peni and Vähämaa 2010). On 
the other hand, El-Mahdy (2015) finds that female CFOs are less likely to manage earning through real activity 
operations within the generally accepted accounting standards compared to male CFOs. This study has several major 
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differences from the aforementioned papers. First, the focus of other studies is the CFO gender, whereas we examine 
the effect of CEO gender since the CEO is the main decision maker of a firm. CEOs or CFOs have different roles in 
managerial decisions. The CEO has the power to make decisions for a firm, while the CFO is mainly responsible for 
financial reporting. Therefore, gender of CEO may affect the earnings management of a firm differently from that of 
CFO. Second, the previous studies look at the average level of abnormal accruals or abnormal real activities across 
the CFO gender. In contrast, this study focuses on the earnings management of suspect firms in which earnings 
management is most likely to occur and shows whether the CEO gender affects the earnings management of suspect 
firms. Lastly, we use a research model designed to control for sample selection bias from gender. 
 
This study contributes to the current accounting by providing empirical evidence that the suspect firms are likely to 
manipulate earnings management if they are operated by male CEOs whereas suspect firms with female CEOs do not 
engage in earnings management. These results can shed a light on the notion that a female CEO is likely to be more 
conservative and make less risky decisions in terms of earnings management.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Gender has been regarded, across academic disciplines, as an influence on behaviour. Especially, many researchers in 
finance have called attention to the relations between gender and firm performance or firm characteristics. Among 
them, gender and the attitude to risk is a commonly examined research area. Previous studies find that female managers 
tend to avoid risk. For instance, Khan and Vieito (2013) document that female CEOs are positively associated with 
firm performance, and negatively associated with risk expressed as the standard deviation of return. This result 
suggests that female CEOs are more risk-averse than male CEOs, which is consistent with the results of Niessen and 
Ruenzi (2006) and Liu et al. (2014). Niessen and Ruenzi (2006) investigate the difference in investment decisions 
between male and female fund managers and find that female fund managers prefer less risky investments. Liu et al. 
(2014) show that female CEOs and three or more female board members are positively associated with their firm’s 
performance. Sun and Liu (2014) also report that having female members in the audit committee is likely to increase 
firm performance and reduce risk, further suggesting that female managers are less likely to take risk.  
 
Previous Literature Also Focuses on Other Behavioral Differences Across the Genders 
 
Vinkenberg et al. (2011) argue that men are more likely to prioritize promotion than women do, implying that men 
have stronger incentive to manage earnings. Through a survey of 213 business school students, Betz et al. (1989) find 
that males are more susceptible to engage in unethical actions: they reveal that 50% of male respondents are willing 
to buy stocks using insider information, compared to 31% of female respondents. In contrast, Adams and Funk (2012) 
survey the effect of gender on the behaviour of the board of directors, and report that female directors are more 
merciful and less power-oriented, but also less tradition and security-oriented and more risk-loving than male directors. 
Except for one study, the overall results imply that female managers would be more cautious and have less incentive 
to engage in unethical behaviour than male managers. 
 
Another stream of studies investigates the association between gender and stock prices to provide insight into the 
market reaction toward the gender of executives within a firm. Lee and James (2007) reveal that investors exhibit a 
negative abnormal return with the announcement of a female CEO appointment. However, the reaction is less harsh 
if the female CEO is promoted from inside the firm than from outside the firm. This finding suggests that investors 
hold negative views towards female CEOs, which may pressure female CEOs to make conservative decisions to 
maintain their positions. On the other hand, Huang and Kisgen (2013) reveal that male executives issue bonds and 
make acquisitions more frequently than female executives. They also find that the stock price is more negative to the 
announcements of acquisitions by male executives than to those by female executives. 
 
In the recent years, several studies in accounting have explored the association between gender and accounting 
information. Krishnan and Parsons (2008) document that firms with greater gender diversity in their management have 
higher earnings quality in terms of conservatism, normal conditions, persistence, and loss avoidance tendency. 
Shawver et al. (2006) also reveal that female accountants have participated in less earnings management than the male 
counterparts. Barua et al. (2010) and Peni and Vähämaa (2010) focus on accrual quality and CFO gender. Barua et al. 
(2010) claim that female CFOs have high accrual quality expressed by lower discretionary accruals and lower accruals 
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volatility. Peni and Vähämaa (2010) suggest that female CFOs are more associated with income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals. They interpret this as meaning that female CFOs tend to prefer conservative accounting 
choices. El-Mahdy (2015) claims that female CFOs engage in inflating earnings through real activities to show their 
abilities to the CEO of the firm. 
 
Earnings management to achieve target earnings has been a frequently discussed area in accounting research. 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) find that the frequency of small positive earnings or small earnings increases is 
unusually higher than that of small negative earnings or small earnings decreases, suggesting that firms tend to inflate 
earnings to avoid small losses or small earnings decreases. In the same line of research, Degeorge et al. (1999) provide 
evidence that firm managers are likely to manage earnings to meet three earnings thresholds: zero earnings, last 
period’s earnings, and analyst forecast consensus. 
 
To measure a firm’s earnings management, two earnings management methods are discussed in the prior accounting 
research: accrual management and real activity management. Accrual management refers to a firm’s opportunistic 
behavior to achieve target earnings through accruals, which has long been used in the accounting literature. Since 
accrual management alters reported earnings through the accounting books, it does not change the cash flows of a 
firm. Also, accruals are usually reversed in the following period. 
 
During the recent years, real activity management has attracted the interest of researchers. Real activity management 
is a technique to manipulate earnings through real action, which can harm firm value in the long run by changing a 
firm’s cash flow. According to a survey by Graham, Havery and Rajgopal (2005), most CFOs prefer taking real action, 
such as cutting discretionary expenses, to meet benchmark earnings. On the other hand, Roychowdhury (2006) 
provides empirical evidence that firms achieving just above zero earnings are more likely to manage earnings through 
real activity to avoid losses. Specifically, Roychowdhury (2006) estimates real earnings management using three real 
activities: reduction in discretionary expenses, over-production, or sales manipulation. This evidence is further 
supported by Gunny (2010) who finds that firms use real activity management to meet either zero earnings or last 
year’s earnings. 
 
Finally, Zang (2011) examines the trade-offs between the two earnings management methods. Since earnings 
management is more likely to be used for meeting or beating important earnings benchmarks, Zang (2011) uses the 
following sample firms in her research: suspect firms meeting or beating zero earnings, the previous year’s earnings, 
analyst forecast earnings, or management forecast earnings. Zang (2011) documents that accrual management and real 
activity management are used as substitutes, based on the relative cost of each method. He also reveals that decision 
on real earnings management precedes that of accrual management. 
 
From the previous literature, we expect that earnings management to avoid losses or earnings decreases is likely to 
occur when the CEO is male, and is not likely when the CEO is female. In summary, a male CEO would be (1) willing 
to make the opportunistic, but risky and possibly unethical decision of managing earnings to maintain his short-run 
position; and (2) confident that he can make up for the effects of such management, whereas a female CEO would be 
reluctant to make such decisions. Thus, we construct the following hypotheses. 
 
H1: Male CEOs are more likely to inflate earnings to avoid losses or earnings decreases. 
 
H2: Female CEOs are not likely to manage earnings to avoid losses or earnings decreases. 
 
3. DATA AND SAMPLE 
 
The CEO-related data, such as gender, age, and compensation, are collected from COMPUSTAT Annual 
Compensation database between 1992 and 2013. The CEO for each company in each year is identified as a value of 
“CEO” in the annual CEO flag (CEOANN) variable, which indicates that this executive served as a CEO for all or 
most of the corresponding fiscal year. These data are merged with the financial data in the non-financial and non-
regulated industries selected from COMPUSTAT Fundamental Annual database between 1990 and 2013 to form an 
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initial sample of 25,599 firm-year observations between 1992 and 2013.1 The sample period begins in 1990 because 
one- to two-year lag data are required to calculate model variables in the regressions.2 Among them, we eliminate 
7,451 observations that do not have the data to calculate the necessary variables. Then, we further delete 3,763 
observations that do not satisfy the requirement of having at least 15 observations in each two-digit SIC industry-year 
group to estimate normal accruals, CFO, production costs, and discretionary expenses; thus arriving at the final sample 
of 14,385 observations. All continuous independent variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent of their 
respective distributions. 
 
Table 1. Sample 
Sample Selection Process 
Filtering process Number of observations 
CEO related data from COMPUSTAT Annual Compensation Database (1992-2013) 34,907 
Financial data from COMPUSTAT Fundamental Annual Database (1990-2013)a 171,787 
Merged two data (1992-2013) 25,599 
Less: Missing data in the necessary variables (7,451) 
Less: Industry-year groups with less than 15 observations (3,763) 
The final sample (1992-2013) 14,385 
Suspect firm sample (1992-2013) 1,123 
 
The previous studies (Roychowdhury 2006, Durtschi and Easton 2005, Burgstahler and Dichev 1997) document firms 
are more likely to manipulate earnings to avoid losses or earnings decreases. To increase the possibility of detecting 
the firms’ earnings management, we define suspect firm-years as observations whose net income or change in net 
income scaled by opening total assets falls into the range between 0 and 0.005. From the final sample, 1,123 of 
observations are identified as suspect firm-years. Table 1 summarizes the above sample filter rules.  
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
To test whether there is a CEO gender effect, we consider two sets of research analysis. First, we partition the sample 
into two subsamples based on the gender of a firm’s CEO, male CEO sample and female CEO sample. Then, we 
construct the following ordinary-least-square (OLS hereinafter) regression, following Roychowdhury (2006), and run 
it on each subsample, separately.3  
 𝐸𝑀#$ = 	𝛽( 	+ 	𝛽*𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒#$/* 	+ 	𝛽0𝑀𝑇𝐵#$/* + 	𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒#$/* 	+ 	𝛽9𝑁𝐼#$	  	+		𝛽<𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡#$ 	+ 		𝛾C𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	 + 	𝛾$𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦		+		𝜀#$            (1) 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
The dependent variable in Equation (1), EM, represents the extent of earnings management. As a proxy for a firm’s 
earnings management, we consider both the accrual management (AM) and real activity management (RM) measures 
widely used in the previous accounting studies. Specifically, the performance-matched discretionary accruals (PMDA) 
are used for estimating a firm’s accrual management whereas real activity management is given by abnormal cash 
flow from operations (Ab_CFO), abnormal production costs (Ab_Prod), and abnormal discretionary expenses 
(Ab_Disexp). The detailed estimation procedure of each measure is as follows. Subscripts i, t, and j represent sample 
firm i in year t and industry j.  
 
AM measure (PMDA): To mitigate potential measurement errors, we use performance-matched discretionary accruals 
as a proxy for earnings management through accruals (Kothari, Leone and Wasley 2005). First, we estimate 
discretionary accruals based on the original Jones model (Jones 1991, Kothari et al. 2005), described below.4   
                                                
1 The Financial and Regulated industries include SIC 6000–6999 and SIC 4400–5000, respectively.   
2 The starting point of 1990 in financial data allows us to calculate total accruals using the income statement approach, which is considered 
conceptually superior to the balance sheet approach (Hribar and Collins 2002). 
3 Following Petersen (2009), t-values are calculated using robust standard errors to correct for potential problems associated with heteroskedasticity 
and firm clustering. 
4 All variables in Equation (3) are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent of their respective distributions. 
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KLMNOKLNOPQ 	= 𝛼* *KLNOPQ + 𝛼0 ∆TNOKLNOPQ 	+ 𝛼3 UUVNOKLNOPQ + 𝜀#.$		   (2) 
 
where TAC denotes total accruals, defined as income before extraordinary items minus cash flows from operating 
activities; TA denotes total assets; ΔS denotes changes in sales; PPE denotes gross property, plant and equipment. 
Subscripts i, t, and j represent sample firm i in year t and industry j. The residuals from Equation (2) estimated by two-
digit SIC industry and year represent discretionary accruals for sample firm i (DACC).  
 
Next, the performance-matched discretionary accrual for firm i is calculated as firm i’s discretionary accruals minus 
the matched firm’s discretionary accruals that has the closest return on assets (ROA)5 within the same industry-year 
group. In the event of ties on ROA, we select the firm with the closest firm size expressed as a natural logarithm of 
assets.  
 
RM measure: As a proxy for a firm’s real activity management, we estimate abnormal cash flow from operations 
(Ab_CFO), abnormal production costs (Ab_Prod), and abnormal discretionary expenses (Ab_Disexp), using the 
following three equations from Roychowdhury (2006).6  
 MXYNOKLNOPQ 	= 	𝛼( 	+ 	𝛼* *KLNOPQ 	+ 	𝛼0 TNOKLNOPQ 	+ 	𝛼3 ∆TNOKLNOPQ 	+ 	ε#$  (3) 
 U[\]NOKLNOPQ 	= 	𝛼( 	+ 	𝛼* *KLNOPQ 	+ 	𝛼0 TNOKLNOPQ 	+ 	𝛼3 ∆TNOKLNOPQ 	+ 	𝛼9 ∆TNOPQKLNOPQ 	+ 	ε#$  (4) 
 ^#_`abNOKLNOPQ 	= 	𝛼( 	+ 	𝛼* *KLNOPQ 	+ 	𝛼0 TNOPQKLNOPQ 	+ 	𝜀#$  (5) 
 
where CFO denotes cash flow from operations; TA denotes total assets; S denotes sales; ΔS denotes changes in sales; 
Prod denotes production costs, defined as the sum of cost of goods sold and change in inventory; Disexp denotes 
discretionary expenses. The residuals from Equations (3)–(5), estimated by each industry and year, represent abnormal 
cash flow from operations (Ab_CFO), abnormal production costs (Ab_Prod), and abnormal discretionary expenses 
(Ab_Disexp) for sample firm i, respectively.  
 
Test Variables  
 
The test variable in Equation (1) is the suspect firm years (Suspect) as an indicator variable, set equal to one if NI or 
change in NI (Δ NI) is equal to or greater than 0 but less than 0.005 and zero otherwise.  
 
Control Variables 
 
Equation (1) includes control variables from Roychowdhury (2006).7 They are firm size (Size) as log transformation 
of opening market value of equity; market-to-book ratio (MTB) as market value over book value of equity at the 
beginning of the year; capital structure (Leverage8) as debt-to-asset ratio. Finally, IndustryDummy and YearDummy 
variables represent dummies for each industry and each year.  
 
The objective of this research question is to predict whether the CEO gender affects earnings management of a firm. 
However, if a firm’s selection on its CEO is affected by firm characteristics or other unobservable characteristics, 
estimates from the OLS regression may be biased (Chaney et al. 2004). The two-stage-least-square procedure (2SLS 
hereinafter) from Heckman (1979), which controls for self-selection bias, may be more appropriate in such setting 
than the OLS method. Thus, we use the following 2SLS model to address the above issue. 
 
                                                
5 ROA is calculated as income before extraordinary items deflated by beginning total assets. 
6 All variables in Equations (4)–(6) are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent of their respective distributions. 
7 All continuous control variables in Equations 1, 6, and 7 are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent to mitigate the effects of outliers. 
8 We include variable Leverage instead of an indicator variable for having debt as in Roychowdhury (2006).   
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In the first stage, we estimate the following probit regression model (Equation 6). The dependent variable, the dummy 
variable Gender, is regressed on a set of control variables that are likely to affect a firm’s choice on the CEO. The 
inverse Mills ratios are computed in the first stage. 
 
Stage 1: the probit regression model 
 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟#$ 	= 𝛼( + 	𝛼*𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒#$/* 	+ 	𝛼0𝑀𝑇𝐵#$/* 	+ 	𝛼3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒#$/* 	+ 	𝛼9𝑁𝐼#$		  	+	𝛼<log𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒#$ + 		𝛼glog𝐴𝑔𝑒#$ + 		𝛼i𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝#$	  	+	𝛼C𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	 + 	𝛼$𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦		+		𝜀#$   (6) 
 
where CEO gender (Gender) is defined as an indicator variable, set equal to one for a female CEO and zero for a male 
CEO. Among control variables, Size, BTM, Leverage, NI, IndustryDummy, and YearDummy are defined as Equation 
(1); logTenure, logAge, and Comp are CEO tenure (as log transformation of CEO tenure), CEO age (as log 
transformation of CEO age), and CEO compensation (as total compensation including options exercised earned by 
the CEO during the fiscal year deflated by opening total asset).  
 
In the second stage, we run the OLS regression in Equation (7) over each subsample divided by CEO gender. Equation 
(7) is the same OLS regression as Equation (1) except that Equation (7) includes the inverse Mills ratios calculated 
from the first stage.  
 
Stage 2: the 2nd stage regression model 
 𝐸𝑀#$ = 	𝛽( 	+ 	𝛽*𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒#$/* 	+ 	𝛽0𝑀𝑇𝐵#$/* + 	𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒#$/* 	+ 	𝛽9𝑁𝐼#$	  		+		𝛽<𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡#$ 	+ 	𝛽g𝐼𝑀𝑅#$ 	+ 		𝛾C𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦	  		+	𝛾$𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦		+		𝜀#$	 (7) 
 
All variables other than IMR are as defined in Equation (1). The inverse Mills ratio (IMR) calculated in the first stage 
regression is included to address the potential self-selection bias in Equation (7).  
 
Model Predictions 
 
When the CEO gender of a firm is male, the direction of coefficient estimate for test variable is predicted based on 
findings in prior studies (Roychowdhury 2006, Burgstahler and Dichev 1997, etc.). Thus, a positive (negative) and 
significant coefficient estimate on the test variable Suspect in Equation (1)—when the dependent variable is the 
performance-matched discretionary accruals (PMDA) or abnormal production costs (Ab_Prod)—is consistent with 
the prediction that suspect firms report small positive earnings or small earnings increases through aggressive 
discretionary accruals or overproduction (Hypotheses 1, 2B). Similarly, a negative and significant coefficient estimate 
on the test variable Suspect—when the dependent variable is abnormal cash flow from operations (Ab_CFO) or 
abnormal discretionary expenses (Ab_Disexp)—implies that suspect firms are more likely to engage in sales 
manipulation or cut discretionary expenses to boost earnings (Hypotheses 2A, 2C). On the other hand, we expect to 
observe an insignificant coefficient estimate on the test variable Suspect in Equation (1) for a firm with female CEO. 
 
To compare the results estimating from the OLS with those from the 2SLS, we run Equation (6) in the 1st stage to 
predict the gender of a CEO from a set of control variables and then estimate test variable Suspect using Equation (7) 
in the 2nd stage. The predictions based on the 2SLS are anticipated to be similar to those from the OLS. 
 
5. MAIN RESULT 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of model variables in Equations (1) and (6) for the 14,385 firm-
year observations. The mean and median values of Gender are 0.0256 (2.56% of total sample for female CEO in Panel 
B of Table 1) and 0, showing that the vast majority of sample firms appoint male CEOs. In general, sample firms have 
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larger market value than book value (mean MTB = 3.0906), less debts than assets (mean Leverage = 0.1997) and 
positive net income (mean NI = 0.0487). The average tenure and age of CEO are 5.85 years and 55.02 years old when 
the means of logTenure and logAge are back-transformed to their original scale. The mean and median values of each 
earnings management measure (EM measures) are 0 or nearly 0. While the performance-matched discretionary 
accruals (PMDA) have both negative mean values (–0.0013), all three RM measures (Ab_CFO, Ab_Prod, and 
Ab_Disexp) have mean value of 0 because they are residuals from each regression model. Regarding median, only the 
abnormal production costs have positive values (0.0079) and other measures have negative median values (PMDA = 
–0.0008; Ab_CFO = –0.0023; Ab_Disexp = –0.0119). Finally, only a few observations belong to suspect firm years 
(mean Suspect = 0.0781 or 7.81% of total sample). 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics. 
Panel A. Full Sample (1992–2013; N = 14,385 observations) 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min 1Q Median 3Q Max N 
Gender 0.0256 0.1579 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 14,385 
Size 7.2878  1.6393  3.3769  6.1881  7.1556  8.3311  11.5499  14,385 
MTB 3.0906  3.4485  −8.0294  1.4800  2.3095  3.7026  21.2003  14,385 
leverage 0.1997  0.1708  0.0000  0.0361  0.1871  0.3081  0.7582  14,385 
NI 0.0487  0.1106  −0.4277  0.0155  0.0584  0.1025  0.3262  14,385 
logTenure 1.7664  0.8603  0.0000  1.0986  1.7918  2.3979  3.5835  14,385 
logAge 4.0077  0.1297  3.6636  3.9318  4.0073  4.0943  4.3175  14,385 
Comp 3.8628  5.9677  0.0648  0.8404  1.8546  4.1744  38.8959  14,385 
PMDA −0.0013  0.0841  −0.4629  −0.0456  −0.0008  0.0444  0.6310  14,385 
Ab_CFO 0.0000  0.0796  −0.4173  −0.0451  −0.0023  0.0432  0.3554  14,385 
Ab_Prod 0.0000  0.1683  −1.8341  −0.0854  0.0079  0.0936  1.2254  14,385 
Ab_Disexp 0.0000  0.1395  −0.5945  −0.0795  −0.0119  0.0635  0.8356  14,385 
Suspect 0.0781 0.2683 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 14,385 
 
Panel B. Female CEOs vs. Male CEOs 
 Female CEOs Male CEOs Difference 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Size 7.1020 6.8402 7.2927 7.1624 −0.1907* −0.3222*** 
MTB 2.9166 2.0294 3.0951 2.3162 −0.1785 −0.2868*** 
leverage 0.1784 0.1415 0.2003 0.1877 −0.0219** −0.0462*** 
NI 0.0355 0.0489 0.0491 0.0587 −0.0136** −0.0098*** 
logTenure 1.5299 1.6094 1.7726 1.7918 −0.2428*** −0.1823*** 
logAge 3.9649 3.9703 4.0089 4.0254 −0.0440*** −0.0551*** 
Comp 4.4296 1.9060 3.8479 1.8506 0.5817* 0.0555 
PMDA −0.0029 −0.0026 −0.0013 −0.0007 −0.0016 −0.0019 
Ab_CFO −0.0089 −0.0084 0.0002 −0.0022 −0.0091** −0.0062** 
Ab_Prod −0.0001 0.0218 0.0000 0.0076 −0.0001 0.0142 
Ab_Disexp 0.0180 −0.0098 −0.0005 −0.0120 0.0185** 0.0021 
Suspect 0.0842 0.0000 0.0779 0.0000 0.0063 0.0000 
N 368 14,017  
Note: In Panel B, mean comparisons and median comparisons are based on t-tests and Wilcoxon tests, respectively. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
 
 
Panel B reports the mean and median values of each variable calculated over 368 firm-years with female CEOs and 
14,017 firm-years with male CEOs. Compared to firms with male CEOs, those with female CEOs have smaller mean 
and median values for all control variables except variable Comp. The differences in mean (median) values between 
female CEO firms and male CEO firms are –0.1907 (–0.3222) for Size, –0.1785 (–0.2868) for MTB, –0.0219 (–0.0462) 
for Leverage, –0.0136 (–0.0098) for NI, –0.2428 (–0.1823) for logTenure, –0.0440 (–0.0551) for logAge, and 0.5817 
(0.0555) for Comp. For any of those control variables, the mean or median difference across CEO gender is significant 
at the 10 percent level.9 This reveals firms run by female CEOs tend to be a smaller size with lower growth opportunity 
                                                
9 Based on these results, all control variables are included in Equation (6) to control the potential endogenous problem. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2017 Volume 33, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 304 The Clute Institute 
and lower performance, but have a lower financial risk in terms of debt to asset ratio. Also, female CEOs are more 
likely to be younger with a shorter tenure than male CEOs while the annual compensation seems to be higher for 
female CEOs. Among EM measures, female CEO firms have lower mean and median values of Ab_CFO than male 
CEO firms whereas mean values of Ab_ Disexp are higher for female CEO firms, and only these differences are 
significant at the 5 percent level. From the mean and median differences of EM measures, earnings management level 
difference by CEO gender seems to be insignificant or mixed. On average, firms run by female CEO seem to be more 
likely to engage in sales manipulation to inflate reported earnings but maintain higher discretionary expenditure level 
to lower earnings, compared to those run by male CEO. Finally, consistent with the observation in Panel B of Table 
1, the test variable Suspect is not statistically different between female and male CEO in terms of mean and median 
values. 
 
Table 3 presents the correlations among four EM measures and independent variables (other than Industry and Year 
dummies) of Equation (1). The pair-wise Pearson (Spearman rank) correlations appear above (below) the diagonal. 
The four EM measures are highly correlated with each other at the 1 percent level. The Pearson correlation coefficients 
between PMDA and Ab_CFO, PMDA and Ab_Prod, PMDA and Ab_Disexp, Ab_CFO and Ab_Prod, Ab_CFO and 
Ab_Disexp, Ab_Prod and Ab_Disexp are –0.3675, 0.1192, –0.0776, –0.4742, 0.0800, and –0.7354, respectively. All 
EM measures are significantly correlated with the test variable Suspect at the 1 percent level as the hypothesized 
direction of earnings management, as documented in the previous studies. The Pearson correlation coefficients 
between Suspect and PMDA, Ab_CFO, Ab_Prod, and Ab_Disexp are 0.0159, –0.0240, 0.0344, and –0.0350, 
respectively, suggesting that suspect firms tend to report significantly larger discretionary accruals and productions 
costs, however, unusually low cash flow from operations and discretionary expenses. These patterns extend to the 
Spearman rank correlations. Untabulated results indicate that the largest variance inflation factor and the largest 
condition index are 1.3549 and 1.8452, respectively. Thus, multicollinearity is remote so it is not a major concern. 
 
 
Table 3. Pearson and Spearman Correlations between variables (1992–2013; N = 14,385 observations) 
 PMDA AbCFO AbProd AbDisexp Size MTB Leverage NI Suspect 
PMDA 
1.0000 −0.3675 0.1192 −0.0776 −0.0773 −0.0720 0.0011 0.0455 0.0159 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.8961 <.0001 0.0563 
AbCFO −0.3569 1.0000 -0.4742 0.0800 0.2024 0.2123 −0.1563 0.5020 −0.0240 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0041 
AbProd 0.1269 −0.4808 1.0000 −0.7354 −0.1587 −0.2367 0.1178 −0.2960 0.0344 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
AbDisexp −0.0900 0.1175 −0.7342 1.0000 0.0919 0.1970 −0.0960 0.0528 −0.0350 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Size −0.0687 0.1991 −0.1683 0.0930 1.0000 0.3391 0.0250 0.3091 0.0237 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 0.0027 <.0001 0.0044 
MTB −0.0485 0.2992 −0.3076 0.2304 0.4851 1.0000 −0.0606 0.2335 −0.0152 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 0.0689 
Leverage 0.0026 −0.1731 0.1386 −0.1088 0.0876 −0.1126 1.0000 −0.1378 0.0346 0.7512 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 
NI 0.0210 0.5101 −0.3314 0.1189 0.3373 0.4990 −0.2027 1.0000 0.0310 0.0119 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  0.0002 
Suspect 0.0171 −0.0223 0.0337 −0.0339 0.0236 −0.0134 0.0462 0.0002 1.0000 0.0401 0.0076 <.0001 <.0001 0.0047 0.1091 <.0001 0.9819  
Note: Pearson correlation coefficients are reported above the diagonal and Spearman rank correlation coefficients are reported below the diagonal. 
The corresponding p-values appear underneath the correlation coefficients.  
 
 
5.2 OLS Analysis Based on Full Sample  
 
As a preliminary check before discussing earnings management on CEO gender difference, we run Equation (1) over 
the full sample of 14,385 observations and report the results based on each earnings management measure of PMDA, 
Ab_CFO, Ab_Prod and Ab_Disexp in Columns (1)–(4) of Table 4, respectively. The coefficient estimates on the test 
variable Suspect in all columns are consistent with findings in the previous studies on earnings management and 
significant at the 5 percent level. More specifically, the coefficient estimate on Suspect is positive when the dependent 
variable is PMDA (0.0048; t-statistics = 2.05) or Ab_Prod (0.0230; t-statistics = 5.08), while the corresponding 
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coefficient estimate is negative when the dependent variable is Ab_CFO (–0.0097; t-statistics = –5.14) or Ab_Disexp 
(–0.0159; t-statistics = –3.97). On the whole, firms appear to increase reported earnings upward to avoid losses or 
earnings decline through aggressive accruals or real activities, such as sales boosting, over-production, or reduction 
in discretionary expenses. 
 
 
Table 4. EM Regression (OLS) Results: Full sample (1992–2013). 
EMit 
(1) PMDA (2) Ab_CFO (3) Ab_Prod (4) Ab_Disexp 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept 0.0358 3.86*** −0.0365 −3.76*** 0.0741 2.82*** −0.0463 −2.02** 
Size −0.0047 −6.76*** 0.0018 2.46** −0.0038 −1.53 0.0035 1.73* 
MTB −0.0017 −5.07*** 0.0022 6.32*** −0.0087 −7.70*** 0.0079 8.59*** 
Leverage 0.0068 1.04 −0.0443 −6.69*** 0.0817 3.96*** −0.0811 −4.25*** 
NI 0.0720 4.93*** 0.3445 27.75*** −0.3741 −13.14*** −0.0211 −0.92 
Suspect 0.0048 2.05** −0.0097 −5.14*** 0.0230 5.08*** −0.0159 −3.97*** 
YearDummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IndustryDummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 1.45% 28.13% 12.89% 4.90% 
N 14,385 14,385 14,385 14,385 
Note: All t-values are calculated using robust standard errors to correct heteroskedasticity problem and firm clustering effect. *, **, and *** indicate 
the significance based on t-value at p-value of less than the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 
5.3 Main Analysis  
 
Table 5 presents the regression results estimated from the OLS (Equation 1) and the 2SLS (Equation 7) over the two 
subsamples partitioned by CEO gender based on PMDA in Panel A, Ab_CFO in Panel B, Ab_Prod in Panel C, and 
Ab_Disexp in Panel D. In each panel, results estimating from the OLS and the 2SLS, based on the male (female) CEO 
sample, appear in Columns 1 and 2 (Columns 3 and 4), respectively. 
 
When the sample is restricted to firms directed by male CEO, the coefficient estimates on Suspect, estimating both 
the OLS and the 2SLS, are significant at the 5 percent level in the same directions as findings based on the full sample 
from Table 5. The coefficient estimates on Suspect estimating from Equation (1) over the male CEO sample are 0.0047 
(t-statistics = 2.00), –0.0097 (t-statistics = –5.10), 0.0224 (t-statistics = 4.86) and –0.0152 (t-statistics = –3.73), based 
on dependent variable PMDA, Ab_CFO, Ab_Prod and Ab_Disexp (see Column 1 of each panel), respectively. The 
results do not change when the 2SLS approach is used. The corresponding coefficient estimates from the 2SLS are 
0.0047 (t-statistics = 2.00), –0.0097 (t-statistics = –5.08), 0.0221 (t-statistics = 4.81), and –0.0149 (t-statistics = –
3.67), respectively, all significant at the 5 percent level (see Column 2 in Panels A-B). In contrast, when the CEO 
gender is female, the coefficient estimate on Suspect is insignificant, regardless of which earnings management 
measure is used (see Column 3). These results remain even if the 2SLS approach is used. For the female CEO sample, 
the coefficient estimate on Suspect, estimated from the 2SLS, is consistently insignificant across each earnings 
management measure based analyses. 
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Table 5. EM Regression Results: Male CEO vs. Female CEO Full sample (1992–2013) 
Panel A. EM (dependent variable) = PMDA and Ab_OCF 
 PMDA Ab_OCF 
Male CEO Female CEO Male CEO Female CEO 
Coef. Coef. Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept 0.0232 1.55 −0.0305 −0.28 −0.0285	 −1.82* −0.1157 −1.34 
Size −0.0048 −6.76*** −0.0093 −2.46** 0.0020	 2.62*** −0.0009 −0.28 
MTB −0.0017 −5.01*** −0.0028 −1.41 0.0022	 6.36*** 0.0014 1.54 
Leverage 0.0039 0.58 0.0941 2.76*** −0.0424	 −6.18*** −0.0955 −3.23*** 
ROA 0.0625 3.94*** 0.2265 3.44*** 0.3491	 25.50*** 0.2535 4.74*** 
Suspect 0.0047 2.00** 0.0093 1.00 −0.0097	 −5.08*** −0.0029 −0.28 
IMR 0.0063 1.12 0.0318 0.78 −0.0044  −0.74 0.0501 1.36 
YearDummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IndustryDummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 1.37% 9.68% 28.25% 30.89% 
N 13,912 367 13.912 367 
 
Panel B. EM (dependent variable) = Ab_Prod and Ab_Disexp 
 Ab_Prod Ab_Disexp 
Male CEO Female CEO Male CEO Female CEO 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept 0.0128   0.28 0.7064 2.01** 0.0011 0.03 -0.4586 −1.30 
Size −0.0037 −1.47 −0.0075 −0.60 0.0034 1.67* 0.0086 0.69 
MTB −0.0090 −8.11*** −0.0018 −0.29 0.0082 8.87*** 0.0018 0.32 
Leverage 0.0818 3.87*** 0.0505 0.48 −0.0825 −4.23*** -0.0629 −0.68 
ROA −0.3965 −11.92*** −0.2563 −1.57 −0.0053 −0.20 0.0238 0.14 
Suspect 0.0221 4.81*** 0.0051 0.18 −0.0149 −3.67*** -0.0092 −0.34 
IMR 0.0291   1.64 −0.2865 −1.90* −0.0225 −1.38 0.1889 1.25 
YearDummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IndustryDummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 13.18% 13.50% 5.20% 16.57% 
N 13,912 367 13,912 367 
Note: All t-values are calculated using robust standard errors to correct heteroskedasticity problem and firm clustering effect. *, **, and *** indicate 
the significance based on t-value at p-value of less than the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level (two-tailed), respectively.  
 
 
Taken together, these results indicate that firms in general tend to intensively use earnings management to achieve 
profit or earnings increases, and this seems to be mainly driven by firms with male CEOs. By comparison, female 
CEOs do not seem to be engaged in earnings management even when there is a strong incentive to do so. These results 
lend support to the predictions resulting from all the hypotheses. In addition, among male group columns, the absolute 
coefficient value size of test variables in case of earnings management using real activities are bigger than that using 
accruals.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
This study examines the effect of gender on earnings management of firms over a 14-year (1992–2013) period. We 
hypothesize that male CEOs are likely to use aggressive discretionary accruals and real actions in order to report small 
positive earnings or small earnings increases whereas female CEOs are not likely to engage in aggressive earnings 
management. Results from both the OLS regression and Heckman’s two-stage model indicate that firms with male 
CEOs tend to report significantly large discretionary accruals and take real actions to achieve profit or earnings 
increases. In contrast, we do not find evidence of aggressive earnings management by firms with female CEOs. 
 
While we have focused on the CEO gender, there are other CEO characteristics that may affect earnings management 
of a firm, such as the CEO age, CEO tenure, or CEO succession path. For future research, to provide a comprehensive 
view we plan to examine the effects of other CEO characteristics on a firm’s earnings management. This line of 
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research may shed light on the findings about the CEO characteristics and earnings management in the current 
accounting literature. 
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